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IMMIGRATION POLICY OF ISRAEL: 
THE UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE OF A JEWISH STATE 
Yehiel S. Kaplan
*
 
I. IMMIGRATION POLICY OF ISRAEL 
Israel was established in an attempt to create a shelter for 
Jews in the Diaspora.  The Law of Return was enacted several years 
after the end of the Second World War.  The Israeli legislature as-
sumed that since Jews have suffered harsh persecutions and anti-
Semitism throughout history, as a minority group, it is legitimate to 
discriminate in favor of those Jews who wish to immigrate to Israel.1  
Jewish history—including the persecution of Jews in parts of the 
world in the twentieth century and especially the holocaust of Jews in 
Europe during the Second World War, when Jews did not have their 
own independent state—was taken into consideration when Israel 
formulated the immigration policy of the Jewish state.  In addition, as 
the nations of the world are granted the right of self-determination, 
Israel, the state of the Jewish nation, enacted this law in an attempt to 
maintain the Jewish majority in a Jewish and democratic state. 
In the Law of Return, Israel granted Jews and those related to 
Jews and married to them the right to immigrate to the Jewish state.  
Section 1 of this law states that every Jew has a right to immigrate to 
Israel: “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh.”2  
In the year 5730-1970 section 4A(a) in Law of Return (Amendment 
No. 2) was added.  It states: 
The rights of a Jew under this law and the rights of an 
oleh under the Nationality Law, 5712-1952, as well as 
 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, Israel.  I wish to thank Adi Solomon, 
research assistant, for her devoted assistance. 
1 Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1950).  The bill was published with an explanato-
ry note in Hatza’ot Chok No. 48 of 12th Tammuz, 5710-1950, at 189. 
2 Law of Return, supra note 1, § 1. 
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the rights of an oleh under any other enactment, are al-
so vested in a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the 
spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the 
spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person 
who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his 
religion.3 
In the amendment to this law the right to immigrate to Israel was thus 
granted to individuals who are non-Jews according to the religious 
definition of a Jew in Orthodox Judaism: a non-Jewish child and 
grandchild of a Jew, a spouse of a Jew, a spouse of a child of a Jew, 
and a spouse of a grandchild of a Jew.  The Israeli legislature also 
stated that it “shall be immaterial whether or not a Jew by whose 
right a right under subsection (a) is claimed is still alive and whether 
or not he has immigrated to Israel.”4 
One of the major purposes of this legislation was: 
 
[t]o enable Jews that were married in mixed-marriage 
to immigrate to Israel together with their non-Jew 
family members, for otherwise those Jews would have 
not immigrated at all.  Mixed-marriage is a very wide-
spread phenomenon among Jews in the Diaspora and 
there is a fear that deprivation of rights from the non-
Jew family member of a Jew will result in the decision 
of Jews not to immigrate to Israel.5 
The aim of section 4A of the Law of Return is “to create an easier re-
ality for mixed families who wish to immigrate to Israel as a whole 
family unit,”6 and this is done: 
in an attempt not to split [the family] and in a desire to 
encourage its immigration to Israel, . . . to provide as-
sistance to those who wish to fulfill the [two] main 
purpose[s] of the Law of Return: . . . that every Jew is 
entitled to immigrate to Israel, and that indeed Jews 
will immigrate to Israel.  [The purpose of this law is] 
to encourage Jews that live outside the boundaries of 
 
3 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 24 LSI 28, § 4A(a) (1969–70). 
4 Id. § 4A(b). 
5 HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. The Minister of Interior [1997] IsrSC 53(2) 728, 755; see also 
HCJ 8030/03 Smoilov v. The Minister of Interior [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 115, 120. 
6 HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. The Minister of Interior [1987] IsrSC 43(4) 793, 834. 
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Israel to immigrate to this state and to enable them as 
much as possible to immigrate to Israel.7 
Immigrants to Israel in light of a right granted to them in the Law of 
Return are also granted the right to be citizens of this state in the Na-
tionality Law.  Section 2 of this law, in particular, grants a person 
who immigrated to Israel as a result of a right granted to him or her in 
the Law of Return an automatic right to obtain Israeli citizenship.8 
In contrast to the easy path of this individual to Israeli citizen-
ship, the path of those who did not immigrate to Israel as a result of a 
right granted to them in the Law of Return, and wish to acquire Israe-
li citizenship by naturalization, is difficult, due to the Minister of In-
terior’s discretion regarding the naturalization process.9 
A new immigration policy has been in effect in Israel as a re-
sult of the outbreak of violence between Palestinians and Jews in 
September 5761-2000.  At that time, the issuing of residency permits 
to Palestinian spouses of Israeli citizens was effectively frozen.  This 
de facto suspension policy was ratified by the Israeli cabinet in May 
2002.  The policy of a ban on family unification for Israeli-
Palestinian couples was introduced by an administrative decision of 
the Ministry of Interior in 5762-2002, and enacted into law in 5763-
2003 by the Israeli House of Representatives (the Knesset) as a result 
of concerns about the security of the State of Israel and its citizens 
stemming from terrorist attacks of Palestinians residing in the occu-
pied territories—the West Bank and Gaza—against Israeli citizens.10  
The Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law imposed significant re-
strictions upon Palestinians from these territories who sought to ob-
tain Israeli citizenship and the right to be residents of Israel.  It barred 
family reunification of non-Israeli Palestinians who were married to 
 
7 Stamka, IsrSC 53(2) at 755. 
8 See Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50, § 2(a) (1951–52). 
9 See Albert K. Wan, Note, Israel’s Conflicted Existence as a Jewish Democratic State: 
Striking the Proper Balance Under the Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law, 29 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 1345, 1351–52 (2004).  The gradual process of obtaining Israeli citizenship by natu-
ralization designed for spouses of Israeli citizens and residents was defined as a result of the 
ruling of the High Court of Justice in the Stamka case, and first detailed in the 1996 policy of 
the State of Israel’s response in HCJ 338/99 Issa v. The Minister of Interior [IsrSC -10 
march 1999] (unpublished decision).  Eventually, as a result of this ruling, the guidelines of 
the Ministry of Interior in 1999 became more flexible.  They were evaluated in the subse-
quent case of the Supreme Court of Israel, HCJ 7139/02 Abas-Batzah v. The Minister of In-
terior [2003] IsrSC 57 (3), 481–94. 
10 Daphne Barak-Erez, Israel: Citizenship and Immigration Law in the Vise of Security, 
Nationality, and Human Rights, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 184, 185 (2008). 
3
Kaplan: Immigration Policy in Israel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
1092 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
Israeli citizens, especially of Palestinian origin, living in Israel.11 
II. JUSTIFICATION OF THE IMMIGRATION POLICY OF ISRAEL 
Israel was defined in its Basic Laws as a “Jewish and demo-
cratic state.”12  It is not easy to reconcile the concepts “Jewish” and 
“democratic” when we analyze the immigration policy of Israel.  On 
the one hand, Israel was established in order to gather all the Jews 
from the exile to the Jewish state.  On the other hand, Israel, as a 
democratic state, declared in its proclamation of independence that it 
is obliged to maintain equal human rights without distinction between 
individuals based upon their race, color, or national origin.13  Is the 
immigration policy of Israel justified in a “Jewish and democratic 
state”? 
The immigration policy of Israel is sometimes criticized as 
being racist, discriminatory, or undemocratic.14  Sometimes Palestini-
ans claim they should be granted the right to immigrate to Israel, their 
“homeland,” as a result of a right granted to them in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.15  This is a United Nations 
treaty entered into force on March 23, 1976.  The International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights currently has 162 states parties, in-
cluding Israel.16  This Covenant grants individuals protection against 
discrimination.  Article 12(4) states: “No one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of the right to enter his own country.”  Article 26 states: “All 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrim-
ination to the equal protection of the law.”  These articles could be a 
basis for the claim by some Palestinians that Israel, in the Law of Re-
turn, arbitrarily deprives them of their right to enter their “own coun-
 
11 Citizenship and Entry Into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 5763-2003, available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/citizenship_law.htm (unofficial translation). 
12 See, e.g., Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, S.H. 90, § 2. 
13 Wan, supra note 9, at 1345–46; see also DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL (Isr. 1948). 
14 See Raef Zreik, Notes on the Value of Theory: Readings in the Law of Return—A Po-
lemic, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 34-42 (2008) (considering whether “[p]olitics means 
that there is [a] group of people which has some common characteristic, be it national, eth-
nic, religious, or any other, and which is willing to defend its way of life as a group and even 
ready to go to war for that reason”). 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
16 Office of the United Nations High Comm’r, Status of Ratifications of the Principal In-
ternational Human Rights Treaties 6 (July 14, 2006), available at http://www2. 
ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/status.pdf 
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try” and discriminates against them. 
Sometimes the claim of Palestinians who wish to immigrate 
to Israel is based upon the right to family life.17  This right has been 
recognized in international law and is mentioned in important inter-
national treaties, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights18 
and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.19  Article 
10(1) of the second Covenant states: “The widest possible protection 
and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society.”20  In addition, other interna-
tional treaties recognize the essential and central role of the family in 
human society.21  International law protects the family in special cir-
cumstances such as by granting immigration rights to family mem-
bers.22  A foreign spouse, married to a citizen or permanent resident 
in Israel, can claim he or she should be granted the right to immigrate 
to Israel in light of the principles of international law. 
However, the foundation of the immigration policy of Israel is 
not “arbitrary” discrimination.  It could be justified in light of the 
unique circumstances of Jewish self-determination in a Jewish state.  
The proponents of the current immigration policy in Israel provide 
several justifications for this policy. 
The scholar Ruth Gavison rejects the claim that the Law of 
Return is a clear case of racism against Arab citizens in Israel.23  She 
explains that all nations have the right to self-determination in their 
own country.  The principle of return of an ethnic group as a means 
of enhancing the self-determination of that group is a common prac-
tice in many states.  Since the Law of Return enables the Jewish peo-
ple to realize their right of self-determination, it can be justified.  
Gavison also notes that the existence of the Jewish state—established 
as a solution to the persecution and distress of Jews as defenseless 
foreigners in the Diaspora—is very significant in the lives of Jews in 
 
17 HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior [2006] 2 TakEI 1754. 
18 ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 23(1) (“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit 
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”). 
19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10(1), G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), at 49, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
20 Id. 
21 See Yuval Merin, The Right of Family Life and Civil Marriage Under International 
Law and its Implementation in the State of Israel, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79, 80 n.2 
(2005). 
22 Id. at 80. 
23 Ruth Gavison, The Jews’ Right to Statehood: A Defense, 15 AZURE 70, 95–96 (2003). 
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Israel and outside its boundaries.24  From the point of view of many 
Jews, the loss of the Jewish state means an end to all the great ad-
vantages they derive from its presence.  Because there is no realistic 
alternative to the current and unique Jewish state, the advantages re-
sulting from the existence of this state cannot be replaced by similar 
advantages in another state.  Therefore, Israel has the right to pre-
serve and to nurture its Jewish identity through, inter alia, its immi-
gration policy. 
The scholar Asa Kasher believes that if a national group has 
been deprived in the past of the conditions that would have enabled it 
to realize its right of self-determination, it ought to now be permitted 
to become a majority in a given territory, thus attaining the conditions 
necessary for its self-determination.  Kasher believes that because 
Jews have suffered throughout history from harsh persecutions and 
prejudice as a minority group, it is legitimate to establish an immigra-
tion policy that discriminates in favor of Jews in Israel.  This state is 
their homeland, and an immigration policy of positive discrimination 
in favor of Jews in Israel maintains their current status as a majority 
group in the Jewish state.  He justifies this policy of Israel in light of 
the unique circumstances of Jewish history and survival calling for a 
special policy of affirmative action.25  Some take into consideration 
the outlook of this scholar as one of the justifications of the immigra-
tion policy of Israel.26 
In addition, a justification for the immigration policy of Israel 
stems from the right to benefit from the advantages of a unique cul-
ture.  As scholars Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal explained, 
the right to culture “stems from the fact that every person has an 
overriding interest in his personality identity—that is, in preserving 
his way of life and the traits that are central identity components for 
him and the other members of his cultural group.”27  From a liberal 
point of view, the right to culture is important since it facilitates au-
tonomy.  When the right of culture is granted to an individual, more 
 
24 Id. at 76–77. 
25 See generally Asa Kasher, Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law 
of Return, 15 ISR.Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 101 (1985); see also CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF 
NATIONALISM 126–27 (2003); Aviad Bakshi, Does a State Have a Primary Obligation to 
Accept Immigrants?, 10 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 387 (2006). 
26 See NA’AMA CARMI, THE LAW OF RETURN: IMMIGRATION RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 35–
55 (2003). 
27 Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 61 SOC. RES. 
491, 505 (1994). 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/20
2015 IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL 1095 
options are available: 
Only through being socialized in a culture can one tap 
the options which give life a meaning.  By and large 
one’s cultural membership determines the horizon of 
one’s opportunities, of what one may become, or (if 
one is older) what one might have been.  Little sur-
prise that it is in the interest of every person to be fully 
integrated in a cultural group.  Equally plain is the im-
portance to its members of the prosperity, cultural and 
material, of their cultural group.  Its prosperity con-
tributes to the richness and variety of the opportunities 
the culture provides access to.28 
Many countries develop the values, tradition, and language of 
a dominant culture.  It is not easy, and sometimes impossible, for 
countries whose populations speak different languages and belong to 
different cultures to implement a policy of equality and neutrality 
concerning culture—and it is not clear that from a liberal point of 
view these countries should attempt to realize this agenda.29  It is dif-
ficult for states with special populations, like the State of Israel, to be 
culturally neutral, and this fact might indicate that the achievement of 
the ideal of cultural equality is not a realistic goal in certain states, 
especially states such as Israel that wish to preserve and develop the 
unique culture of the dominant group in the population.  Therefore, 
Jewish culture is and should be the dominant culture in Israel. 
Chaim Gans held that the Law of Return—or at least a weak-
ened version of it which grants some priority to Jews in immigration 
to Israel in order to preserve the Jewish character of the state—is a 
legitimate means for cultural preservation.30  The justification of na-
tionality-based priorities in immigration to states such as the State of 
Israel derives from interests that individual human beings, such as the 
Jews in Israel, have in their own existence and self-determination.31  
 
28 JOSEPH RAZ, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: 
ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 170, 177 (rev. ed. 1995). 
29 Will Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, in 
CAN LIBERAL PLURALISM BE EXPORTED?: WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY AND ETHNIC 
RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 13, 16–21 (Will Kymlicka & Magda Opalski eds., 2001). 
30 Chaim Gans, Individuals’ Interest in the Preservation of Their Culture: Its Meaning, 
Justifications, and Implications, 1 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 6-16 (2007) . 
31 Chaim Gans, Nationalist Priorities and Restrictions in Immigration: The Case of Israel, 
2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. Vol. 2, Iss. 1, Art. 12,1,5-6 (2008); CHAIM GANS, FROM RICHARD 
WAGNER TO THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI 
7
Kaplan: Immigration Policy in Israel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
1096 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
The preservation of the right to culture could be the foundation, from 
a liberal perspective, of the current immigration policy of the home-
land of the Jews.  Muslims, Christians, and other believers could sur-
vive and flourish in many states that preserve their values, culture, 
and religion; Jews do not have an alternative to the Jewish state. 
The scholar Na’ama Carmi also believes that the preservation 
of the Jewish majority’s culture could be an appropriate basis for the 
immigration policy of Israel.  Although she is aware of the fact that 
“demographic considerations” could be associated with racism, she 
believes that it is not clear they are always illegitimate since some-
times they “have a strong and relative connection to the legitimate in-
terest in preserving culture.”32 
In addition, the immigration to Israel of many individuals that 
do not share the values and religion of the Jewish majority could be 
counterproductive.  Solidarity is important in all societies—including 
the society of a Jewish and democratic state.33  According to this ar-
gument, an essential foundation of a stable society is a strong mutual 
goal embodied in a social contract of its members.  When there is a 
mutual goal, there is also a sense of solidarity among members of the 
society.  This foundation produces the willingness of many members 
of the society to act for the common good.  When there is less har-
mony and unity in a society, it is less likely this society will remain a 
unified group for many years.  The mutual foundation of the social 
contract in a Jewish state is the preservation of the principles, life-
style, and outlook of Judaism.  Consequently, a Jewish and democrat-
ic state could impose limits upon immigration and establish an immi-
gration policy that encourages immigration of Jews and their relatives 
to Israel, since this act will enhance solidarity in the society in Israel. 
It is not so easy to justify the immigration policy in the Citi-
zenship and Entry Into Israel Law.  This law goes one step beyond 
the previously existing rules of immigration in Israel.  In the past, the 
immigration policy of Israel was based upon granting preference to 
 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 205-10 (Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 2006). 
32 Na’ama Carmi, Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considerations and 
Preservation of Culture, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 29 (2008).  See also CARMI, supra 
note 26, at 48.  While Carmi believes that each person has a universal right to immigrate to 
other countries and the state should provide strong arguments in order to prevent the immi-
gration of individuals across its boundaries, she is sympathetic to the argument favoring Is-
rael’s immigration policy based upon preservation and development of the culture of the ma-
jority in Israel at present. 
33 CARMI, supra note 26, at 58. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/20
2015 IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL 1097 
Jewish immigrants and their relatives and spouses over immigrants 
from all other groups.  The new law specifically singles out a group 
of Palestinians for exclusion. 
Israeli authorities have sought to justify the immigration poli-
cy in the Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law on security grounds.  
The security consideration was raised in the explanatory text accom-
panying this law when it was first proposed.  The State claimed that 
Palestinians from the occupied territories have been involved in secu-
rity-related offenses; therefore, the enactment of this new law is re-
quired as a means to prevent terrorist attacks.  According to then-
Israeli government minister Gideon Ezra, there have been many le-
thal attacks in the last few years involving Palestinians who entered 
Israel from the occupied territories.34 
However, some claim that this law was enacted in an attempt 
to reduce the percentage of Israeli Arabs among the population of Is-
rael.  The rules of this law were analyzed in the Adalah case.35  Ada-
lah is a legal organization for the enhancement of Arab minority 
rights in Israel.  It challenged the constitutionality of this new Israeli 
law in a petition to the High Court of Justice and sought to revoke it 
as unconstitutional.  It claimed that security considerations were not 
the main motivation of the enactors of this law, but that the primary 
motivation of those who enacted this law was demographic. 
In his response to the petition of the Adalah organization, the 
Attorney General of Israel claimed that since the beginning of securi-
ty problems, in a period known as the “second intifada,” until the en-
actment of this law in 2003, Palestinians from the occupied territories 
who received the status of legitimate residents in Israel as a result of 
family unification were sometimes involved in facilitating terror at-
tacks.  The State of Israel claimed that there is a security imperative 
to prevent the entry of residents of the occupied territories into Israel, 
since their entry into Israel and their free movement within the state’s 
borders after receiving Israeli documentation are liable to endanger 
the peace and security of the citizens and residents of the state.36 
The Supreme Court of Israel, by a vote of six to five, reached 
the conclusion that this law is valid.  One of the six Justices who 
 
34 Joanne Mariner, Israel’s New Citizenship Law: A Separation Wall Through the Heart, 
FINDLAW’S WRIT (Aug. 11, 2003), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20030811.html. 
35 See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah v. Minister of Interior [2006] 2 TakEI 1754 (unpublished) 
(14.5.2006). 
36 See Adalah, 2 TakEI 1754 (Feb. 2, 2006), Cheshin, D.C.J.,  ¶ 110. 
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found the law was constitutional, Deputy Chief Justice Cheshin, ex-
plained that the Palestinians who are residents of the occupied territo-
ries constitute a risk group for the citizens and residents of Israel.37  
Although this law was upheld, the gap between the majority and mi-
nority Justices in this decision was not wide, and some of the Justices 
in the majority granted weight to the fact that this law was not a per-
manent enactment. 
III. WHO IS A JEW IN LEGISLATION ENCOURAGING 
IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL? 
There is a constant clash between two groups among the Jew-
ish population in Israel, secular and religious Jews, in regard to the 
appropriate interpretation of the concept “Jew” in the legislation that 
grants these individuals the right to immigrate to Israel and receive 
citizenship of this state.  This is part of a broader dispute about the 
Jewish character of the State of Israel.  The Court is granted a right to 
interpret the law of the Jewish state in legal decisions.  However, this 
interpretation engenders debate among the Judiciary and is an echo of 
the secular-religious divide across the Jewish population in Israel.  It 
is hard to find an appropriate definition of a “Jew” in Israeli legisla-
tion since there is a significant gap in Israel between the perspectives 
of religious Orthodox Jews and non-Orthodox Jews.  Probably a dia-
logue between moderate Jewish spiritual leaders and the leaders of 
secular Jews in Israel could bear good fruit.  The Israeli courts have 
been struggling with the definition of a Jew especially in the Law of 
Return, since the establishment of the Jewish state imposed its own 
agenda.  The courts chose their own formula of balancing between 
the outlook and feelings of the religious and secular segments of the 
Jewish society in Israel, which was not based upon popular consensus 
or dialogue. 
A secular definition of a “Jew”—mentioned in the Law of Re-
turn—was adopted by the Supreme Court of Israel in the Rufeisen 
case38 and developed further in the Shalit case.39  The specific issue in 
Shalit was whether the minor children of a Jewish father and an ag-
nostic mother of non-Jewish parentage could be registered in Israel’s 
 
37 See id. ¶¶ 109-10. 
38 HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. The Minister of Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2428; see also 
Ralph Slovenco, Brother Daniel and Jewish Identity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (1964). 
39 HCJ 58/68 Shalit v.The Minister of Interior [1969] IsrSC 23(2) 477. 
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population register as of Jewish nationality, in its secular/ethnic con-
notation, if the parents so desire.  The father, the petitioner in this 
case, demanded that his children be registered in the population regis-
ter of Israel as Jewish although they are not defined as Jews under the 
principles of Orthodox Judaism.  He contested the refusal of the reg-
istration officer to register his children as being ethnically of Jewish 
affiliation.  A few of the Justices tried to avoid controversy by con-
fining the focus in their decision to a narrow point: does the registrar 
have the power to examine the correctness of the parents’ declaration 
that a child is Jewish, and is he granted the right to refuse registration 
if his examination of this matter leads him to doubt its correctness?  
According to the outlook of these Justices, registration of an individ-
ual as a Jew is an act in the sphere of statistics and registration; there-
fore, a bona fide declaration by an individual that he or she, or his or 
her children are Jewish is usually sufficient.40  The declaration estab-
lishes his or her identity as a “Jew.”  However, this Court policy is 
problematic, for if a person is actually not a Jew according to a “cor-
rect” definition, then the declaration that he is a Jew might not be in 
good faith.41 
The traditional religious definition of a Jew was not adopted 
when laws concerning the return of Jews to Israel and citizenship in 
this state were interpreted.  This religious perspective, the traditional 
criteria of Orthodox Judaism, is valid only when Rabbinical Courts in 
Israel determine who is a Jew who is subjected to their jurisdiction.  
The desire of the father in the Shalit case—that in Israel Jewish na-
tionality need no longer be regarded as identical with religious affilia-
tion—was fulfilled.42  Since the father of the children in this case was 
Jewish and the mother born as Christian but not professing any reli-
gion, the entire family living in Israel and closely involved in the 
Jewish society in this state, and the two parents, the guardians of 
these children, desiring that they maintain this special bond with this 
society, the Justices held that the children of the Shalit family should 
be registered as Jews by nationality although their mother was not 
Jewish and they did not convert to Judaism and therefore were not 
Jews according to the Orthodox definition.  The traditional criteria of 
 
40 The foundation of the policy of the Supreme Court of Israel in this sphere is the deci-
sion of the Court, in a different context, in HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Inte-
rior [1963] IsrSC 17(1) 225. 
41 Cf. Benjamin Akzin, Who Is A Jew?: A Hard Case, 5 ISR. L. REV. 259, 259 (1970). 
42 Id. at 262. 
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Orthodox Judaism are valid only when Rabbinical courts in Israel de-
termine who is a Jew in an attempt to define who are or are not Jews 
subjected to their jurisdiction.43 
After this decision, the Israeli legislature responded to the op-
position of the religious segment of society to such a secular defini-
tion of a Jew and adopted a new definition of the concept “Jew” in 
Amendment No. 2 to the Law of Return.  This definition was the re-
sult of dialogue and compromise.44  According to section 4B of the 
Law of Return as amended, Israeli citizenship is granted to any “Jew” 
defined as an individual born to a Jewish mother, or a convert to the 
Jewish faith, provided that this person is not affiliated with “another 
religion.”45 
This definition of a “Jew” is a compromise between two op-
posite outlooks.46  It is closer to the traditional Orthodox definition of 
a Jew.  However, the definition of the legislature is not identical to 
the religious definition of a Jew.  In current Orthodox Jewish law, a 
Jew is a son or daughter of a Jewish mother.  In addition, the conver-
sion of a Jew to another religion is not valid.47  According to the prin-
ciples of Jewish law, when a Jew converts to another religion he or 
she is violating the commandments of Jewish law but does not be-
come a member of another religion as a result of this act.  However, 
the Israeli legislature stated that a “Jew” in the Law of Return is not 
“a member of another religion.”48  Another possible deviation from 
the clear-cut Orthodox perspective is in the sphere of conversion to 
Judaism.  The legislature used the words “has become converted to 
Judaism,”49 but did not mention the requirements concerning conver-
sion.  This was a decision not to decide about the standard of conver-
sion.  The desire of those who were insisting that the legislature state 
explicitly that only the strict standard of conversion of Orthodox Ju-
daism should be legitimate was not fulfilled.  The option of a differ-
ent standard of conversion to Judaism—performed by the Conserva-
tive or Reform movements—was not rejected. 
 
43 See Shalev Ginossar, Who Is A Jew: A Better Law?, 5 ISR. L. REV. 264, 264–65 (1970). 
44 Id. at 264. 
45 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), supra note 3, § 4B. 
46 Ginossar, supra note 43, at 264–67. 
47 See generally HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. The Minister of Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2428. 
48 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), supra note 3, § 4B. 
49 Id. 
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In Association of Torah Observant Sefardim-Tenuat Shas,50 
the opinion of the majority of Justices of the Supreme Court was that 
the requirements of Population Registry Law51 were fulfilled, for the 
purpose of establishing conversion to Judaism of individuals in Jew-
ish communities outside the boundaries of Israel, when the convert 
made a statement that he or she was converted to the Jewish faith in a 
Jewish community outside the territory of Israel.  Since it is a matter 
of registration, this statement and a document produced by the con-
vert attesting that he or she was converted to Judaism are sufficient.  
There is no distinction for the purpose of registering this conversion 
among the conversions of the Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform 
Movements in the Diaspora; the Orthodox standard of conversion is 
not relevant when the policy of registration is determined.  Only 
when there is a solid factual basis leading to the suspicion of fraud on 
the part of the individual who claims to have been converted can the 
State refuse to register this individual in the population registry as a 
Jew.52 
However, in the Beresford case, a religious Justice of the Su-
preme Court, Menachem Elon, adopted a religious interpretation of 
the definition of a “Jew” in section 3A(2) of the amended Population 
Registry Law, which is the same as the definition of a “Jew” in sec-
tion 4B of the Law of Return—i.e., a person “who was born of a Jew-
ish mother, or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a 
member of another religion.”  His criteria for defining a “Jew” consti-
tuted a departure from the secular approach applied by the Court in 
the Rufeisen and Shalit cases.  According to his outlook, the defini-
tion of a “Jew” in the secular legislation of Israel is objective-
normative.  He stated that the acceptance of this objective-normative 
definition of a Jew in the legal system of the Jewish state, including 
adherence to the Orthodox pattern of conversion in Jewish law, could 
ensure the unity of the Jewish nation with an agreed standard of Jew-
ish identity.53  However, the majority of the Justices in Beresford did 
not share this point of view.  Justice Aharon Barak stated he could 
not accept the criteria used by Justice Elon for defining Jewish identi-
 
50 HCJ 264/87 Ass’n of Torah Observant Sefardim-Tenuat Shas v. Dir. of Population Reg-
istry [1989] IsrSC 33(2) 723. 
51 Population Registry Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 288 (1964–65). 
52 The foundation of this policy, in addition to the abovementioned Funk-Schlesinger 
case, HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior [1963] IsrSC 17(1) 225, is the 
Miller case.  See HCJ 230/86 Miller v. Minister of Interior [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 436. 
53 HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of Interior [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 793, 812. 
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ty for secular legal purposes, such as those related to the Law of Re-
turn.  He held that the traditional criteria were static and would not 
admit any change in the future; Barak preferred the secular approach 
adopted in the Rufeisen case since according to his point of view it 
had a more dynamic nature and was capable of undergoing changes 
in the course of time.54  This secular definition relies on the fact that 
an individual, defined as a “Jew,” identifies with the culture of the 
Jewish majority in Israel. 
IV. CONVERSION OF IMMIGRANTS: THE POLICY OF THE STATE 
The conversion of individuals who identify with the Jewish 
majority is a final stage in the process of increasing that majority in 
Israel, also in the religious sphere, in an era of military conflict be-
tween Israel and enemies from the surrounding population.  It is the 
mission of the Jewish state to add more members to the Jewish ma-
jority in Israel in an attempt to enhance solidarity within the state.  In 
addition, having a distinct majority of Jews in Israel is essential in 
order for the state to maintain and strengthen solidarity with the Jews 
in the Diaspora.55  This solidarity is important for Israel since the 
Jews in the Diaspora make a significant contribution to Israel in the 
political and financial spheres. 
The scholar Asher Cohen wrote that in the year 5768-2008, 
approximately 320,000 individuals reside in Israel who are not con-
sidered Jews under religious law, and 5,000 more join this group each 
year.56  Most of the members of this group came to Israel in mass mi-
gration from the former Socialist Republics of the Soviet Union, as a 
result of a right granted to them in the Law of Return.  Many are de-
scendants of Jews.  They have a Jewish father and a non-Jewish 
mother, or are grandchildren of a Jewish grandfather.  Some are 
spouses of Jews. 
In spite of the fact that this is a large group of individuals who 
 
54 Id. at 825–28. 
55 See Israel Inst. for Democracy, Israel Towards a Constitutional Democracy: The Rela-
tionship Between State and Religion, http://www.idi.org.il/ResearchAndPrograms/Public_ 
Council/Pages/Public_council_1_i.aspx. 
56 Asher Cohen, The Conversion Challenge, 313 NEKUDAH 31, 32 (2008).  The special 
courts for conversion in Israel provide conversion services only to immigrants who immi-
grated to Israel legally.  They do not convert illegal immigrants.  See HCJ 552/04 Guzman v. 
The Minister of Interior [IsrSC July 3, 2005] (unpublished decision); HCJ 8811/07 Kintart v. 
The Minister of Interior [IsrSC Mar. 24, 2008] (unpublished decision); HCJ 4278/08 Yurko 
v. The Minister of Interior [IsrSC Feb. 2, 2009] (unpublished decision). 
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at present identify with the Jewish nation, there are fewer than 2,000 
conversions to Judaism in Israel each year.57  According to Cohen, 
many of the non-Jews who live in Israel and belong to this group 
identify with the political goals of the Jewish state, and are assimilat-
ing into the secular Israeli society in the social sphere.  Cohen be-
lieves this is a social conversion to Judaism without the religious 
component of accepting the doctrine of the religious principles of the 
Jewish faith.58  During the process of social conversion, the members 
of this group become members of the Jewish society in Israel, learn 
the Hebrew language, are educated in the Israeli educational system, 
serve in the Israeli Defense Forces, and adopt the behavioral and cul-
tural patterns of the secular Jewish society in Israel without a reli-
gious act of conversion.  Cohen argues that this reality—of a social 
conversion without a religious conversion—is not desirable.  A sig-
nificant group of immigrants in Israeli society live in a vaguely prob-
lematic situation.  Sociologically they belong to the Jewish group, but 
Jewish law and the religious establishment in Israel define the mem-
bers of this group as non-Jews.  In addition, this reality does not en-
hance solidarity among members of the Jewish community in Israel. 
Cohen argues that the State of Israel should intervene in an at-
tempt to assist members of this group who wish to join the Jewish 
faith.  The State of Israel and the Israeli society should help this 
group of immigrants and their relatives, children, and spouses to as-
similate in Israeli Jewish society by encouraging a more lenient con-
version process.  Cohen sees the conversion of members of this group 
as a national challenge and not simply a personal matter for those 
who wish to convert in a Rabbinical court.  He explains that the adop-
tion of the strict approach to conversions in Rabbinical courts in Isra-
el will be an obstacle for those who wish to realize the Zionist dream 
of joining and maintaining the Jewish majority in Israel.  It will cause 
the rejection of more and more applications of non-Jewish immi-
grants who wish to convert and also join the Jewish society in the re-
ligious sphere.  By encouraging the Rabbis and Rabbinical courts in 
Israel to adopt a more lenient approach towards conversion, the State 
of Israel can fulfill the purpose of its establishment—to implement 
the Zionist outlook in reality.59 
 
57 Cohen, supra note 56, at 32. 
58 Id. at 33. 
59 Asher Cohen, Israeli Assimilation: Between Proselytizing by Halakha, “Social  Conver-
sion” and “Secular” Conversion, 14 TZOHAR 117, 121 (2003). 
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The State of Israel encouraged the establishment of special 
Rabbinical Courts for conversion that assist candidates for conversion 
and fund their activity.  Most of these candidates are immigrants to 
Israel and their children who are citizens of the state and wish to con-
vert and as a result be part of the Jewish majority in the religious 
sphere.  Many in this group of non-Jewish immigrants already identi-
fy with the national and political agenda of the Jewish majority in Is-
rael.  When they convert to Judaism, they also accept the ideology of 
the Jewish religion.  The new religious identity of the converts grants 
them more autonomy and an elevated social status.  Without conver-
sion, when these individuals are part of a minority culture in Israel, 
“the options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, be-
come less attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be successful.”60 
A lenient policy regarding the conversion of these immigrants 
and their descendants also promotes their rights in the spheres of hu-
man dignity and liberty, rights whose normative status in Israel was 
elevated with the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty.61  The immigrants who wish to convert to Judaism believe 
that conversion will help them realize their dream to be part of the 
Jewish majority in Israel.  After their conversion, they will be fully 
integrated into Jewish society.  They will be treated by members of 
the Jewish majority as fellow Jews, and their new status could enable 
them and their descendants to marry Jews in Israel.  Some of them 
feel they are part of the Jewish nation since their ancestors were Jew-
ish, and some believe in the ideology of the Jewish religion and wish 
to observe the commandments of Jewish law.  According to their per-
spective, conversion to Judaism is a contribution to their human dig-
nity.  For them and others in Israel, the special significance of the 
constitutional right to human dignity is, among other things, “the 
ability of a human being . . . to express his desires and choose paths 
for their fulfillment . . . to receive fair treatment by each authority and 
by each individual.”62 
Rabbinical courts should find out if a candidate for conver-
sion is sincere.  However, a lenient approach when a candidate for 
conversion comes before the Rabbinical courts is preferable because 
it enhances the liberty of the convert.  The meaning of the right to 
 
60 JOSEPH RAZ, National Self-Determination, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 
28, at 125, 134 (with Avishai Margalit). 
61 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 45 LSI 150 (1992). 
62 Meir Shamgar, Human Dignity and Violence, 3 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 33, 40–41 (1995). 
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liberty in this basic law is “the free will of the individual.  The right 
to human dignity is the right of free choice granted to an individual 
that enables him or her to develop his or her personality and to make 
decisions that shape his or her destiny.”63  As the Court held in 
Nachmani v. Nachmani, “Liberty in its full sense is not only the free-
dom from external intervention of the authorities or others.  It in-
cludes the ability of an individual to choose the direction of his own 
course of life, to fulfill his basic desires and to use discretion that en-
ables him or her to make a choice from a range of possible choic-
es.”64  Isaiah Berlin explained that the “positive” meaning of the 
word liberty stems from the desire of an individual to be the master 
of his own fate.  He or she desires to be able to execute his or her 
own voluntary actions and not be subjected to the will of other indi-
viduals.  The individual wants to be a subject, not an object.65 
When an individual converts, he or she decides voluntarily to 
become dependent.  Conversion is a free choice to be subjected to the 
commandments of Jewish law: 
The American notion of freedom requires independ-
ence. . . . The right of independence—for individual as 
well as nation—is essentially alien to the Jewish per-
spective. . . . Freedom to an American denotes a right.  
Freedom to a Jew refers mainly to a power. . . . Juda-
ism’s denigration of rights in the characterization of its 
conception of freedom is a direct consequence of its 
over-arching concern with duties or obligations. . . . 
Judaism’s paramount concern is with imposition of 
obligations, i.e., mitzvot.  Their commanding authority 
derives either from the rightness of the act prescribed 
by the imperative (which should be construed in reli-
gious terms as the expression of the Divine will) or 
from the rightness of the act together with the fact of 
commitment.66 
Converts are “adults, exercising free will, who will immediately as-
 
63 AHARON BARAK, 3 INTERPRETATION IN LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 426 
(1994). 
64 CA 2401/95 Nachmani v. Nachmani [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 661, 682–83. 
65 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2002). 
66 Sol Roth, Two Concepts of Freedom, 13 TRADITION 59, 61–64 (1972–73). 
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sume their role as Jews.”67 
Indeed, the establishment of courts for conversion funded by 
the State of Israel is certainly not in the spirit of the idea of separation 
of church and state.  This separation stems from a viewpoint that a re-
ligious conviction is a personal matter which should be left free from 
state interference.  However, in the unique legal system of Israel, a 
Jewish state, there is no separation between state and religion.  Ruth 
Gavison justifies the current interaction between law and religion in 
the Jewish state by first noting that religion is important in the history 
of many nations.  Those who regard religion as a private matter ig-
nore this fact, which is evident after a deep analysis of history.  
Moreover, the role of religion and the perspective of the religious 
population are very important in Israeli politics.  Israel is defined in 
its declaration of independence as a Jewish state and, as a result of 
this definition, the adoption of a policy of separation between the 
Jewish religion and the state in Israel is problematic.68  In Israel, a 
Jewish state, we should take into consideration the perspective of Ju-
daism.  The Jewish religion is a collective-communal religion, and 
the religious and national identities of Jews are identical.  The defini-
tion of the Jewish collective in religious law is identical to the nation-
al identity of this collective.  A separation between the state and reli-
gion in Israel is also contrary to the vision of the Zionist movement 
that the State of Israel, as the homeland of the Jews, will solve the 
problems the Jews encounter when they are a minority in the Diaspo-
ra. 
V. CONVERSION OF IMMIGRANTS: THE POLICY OF THE 
RABBINICAL COURTS 
The Rabbinical courts for conversion in Israel have adopted a 
lenient approach in Jewish law.  This policy, in favor of conversion, 
is an attempt to assist, as much as possible, candidates for conversion, 
who are usually immigrants to Israel or their children.  The special 
courts’ more lenient approach to conversion enables immigrants and 
their children to more easily join a desirable religion.  Nevertheless, 
conservative elements in the Rabbinate and a group of Jewish judges 
 
67 Jerry Hochbaum, Who is a Jew: A Sociological Perspective, 13 TRADITION 35, 39 
(1972–73). 
68 Ruth Gavison, Religion and State: Separation and Privatization, 2 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 
55, 56–57 (1994). 
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in the regular Rabbinical courts in Israel oppose this lenient policy. 
The debate between the lenient and strict Rabbis concerning 
the conversion policy in Jewish law is ancient.  All agree that Jewish 
law encourages Jews to love sincere and pious converts.  An im-
portant commandment in the Bible—“And you shall love the for-
eigner”69—imposes an obligation upon Jews to treat friends and for-
eigners in the same manner.  Foreigners, including converts to 
Judaism, should feel that the foundation of their relationship with 
Jews is the love of Jews for them.  The Bible stresses, many times,70 
that Jews should love foreigners.  In addition to the positive com-
mandment to love the foreigner, there is a negative commandment 
not to insult or shame the foreigner.71  Ancient Jewish scholars have 
emphasized that many times—thirty-six times according to one opin-
ion and forty-six times according to another—Biblical law prohibited 
acts that offend or shame foreigners.72  This is part of a general per-
spective that love among all human beings is a basic foundation of 
Jewish law.73 
In the medieval period, Maimonides, an important medieval 
Jewish scholar, in his codification of Jewish law Mishneh Torah, 
places the directive that Jews should love foreigners who converted 
to Judaism between two principles of  Jewish law:74 one, that a per-
son should love other individuals as he loves himself,75 and the other: 
“Do not hate your brother in your heart.”76  He explains, “Loving the 
foreigner who enters the wings of the Divine Presence comprises two 
good acts: one, since he is actually a friend, and the other, since he is 
a foreigner, and the Torah states that ‘you shall love the foreigner.’ 
”77  He adds that the two commandments coincide.  One command-
ment is the directive: “And you shall love your G-od.”78  But Jews 
should also love foreigners since G-od Almighty loves them, as stat-
ed in the holy ancient text.79 
 
69 Deuteronomy 10:19. 
70 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 59B. 
71 Exodus 22:20. 
72 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 59B. 
73 See Leviticus 19:17. 
74 See MISHNEH TORAH, Deot 6:4–6. 
75 Leviticus 19:18. 
76 Id. 19:17. 
77 MISHNEH TORAH, Deot 6:4 (quoting Deuteronomy 10:19). 
78 See Deuteronomy 6:5; 11:1. 
79 See id. 10:18. 
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For Maimonides, this was practice and not mere theory.  In 
his responsa he adopted a generous approach to a foreigner who 
joined the Jewish nation and accepted the commandments of the Jew-
ish faith, the convert Ovadia.80  Maimonides emphasized that there is 
a special duty to love this foreigner—“who left his father, his home-
land and the powerful kingdom of his nation, and understood . . . that 
their religion [of the Jews] is a religion of truth and justice . . . and 
entered the wings of the Divine Presence and accepted the principles 
of [the law of] Moses, the leader of all the prophets, and his desire 
was to follow his commandments.”81  He addressed indirectly the 
problem of the contradiction between two approaches in ancient Jew-
ish texts in regard to the prayer of the convert that could cause 
shame,82 and preferred the outlook in these texts that prevents possi-
ble unpleasantness and shame to foreigners who joined the Jewish 
faith.  In his responsa to Ovadia the convert, Maimonides wrote that 
this convert could use the regular language in the prayer of all Jews: 
“the G-od of our ancestors.”  This sensitive policy will prevent possi-
ble shame to him.  A different prayer for this convert, if he should re-
cite it in the presence of his fellow Jews, could reveal that he con-
verted to Judaism and is not a descendant of the Jewish nation’s 
ancestors.  Maimonides explained his preference as justified since: 
Abraham taught all people . . . the religion of truth and 
about the uniqueness of G-od, and fought against idol-
atry and . . . commanded his sons and the members of 
his family to observe [the commandments to those 
who follow] G-od’s path. . . . [T]herefore, whoever 
converts to Judaism until the last generation and be-
lieves that G-od [of the Jews], mentioned in the Bible, 
is the only [true G-od] is a follower of Abraham, may 
he rest in peace, and one of the members of his family. 
. . . As he [Abraham] reformed the individuals of his 
 
80 Regarding the identity of the convert, see MENACHEM FINKELSTEIN, PROSELYTISM: 
HALAKHAH AND PRACTICE 15 n.8 (1994). 
81 Responsa Maimonides 2:448; see also id. 2:293. 
82 In ancient sources, from the Tanaitic period, it is written explicitly that a foreigner can-
not say a prayer which includes the words “our ancestors.”  MISHNAH, Bikurim 1:4; 
TOSEFTA, Bikurim 1:2.  However, the subsequent Amoraic literature mentions the opinion of 
Rabbi Judah, according to which a foreigner can say a prayer which includes these words, 
since Abraham was a father of many gentiles.  JERUSALEM TALMUD, Bikurim 1:4.  The inter-
pretation of Maimonides in this case is an adoption of the opinion in the Jerusalem Talmud 
and rejection of the principle in Tanaitic literature. 
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generation through his teaching . . . [he] is the father 
of his descendants, which follow him, and the father 
of all of his followers and whoever converts to Juda-
ism.  Therefore, you can say: “Our G-od and the G-od 
of our ancestors,” for Abraham, may he rest in peace, 
is your father.83 
Although Maimonides mentioned other requirements for a 
valid conversion including circumcision and immersion,84 it is evi-
dent that one of the basic elements of conversion is the acceptance of 
the religious tenets of Judaism and the principles of Jewish law.  Ac-
cording to Maimonides, conversion is an outcome of a sincere spir-
itual revolution in the soul of the convert, who pursued “G-od” and 
“entered the wings of the Divine Presence” and accepted the directive 
of “Moses, the Rabbi of all the prophets.”85  In order to accomplish 
the spiritual conversion in the foreigner’s soul, the Rabbinical court 
should first tell the candidate what are the “basic [foundations] of the 
[Jewish] religion, which are monotheism and the prohibition of idola-
try[,] and it should prolong the focus upon this matter.”86 
The convert should adopt a new religious ideology and also 
join the Jewish nation.  The convert cannot perform only the religious 
act; the conversion is also not valid when the convert only joins the 
Jewish nation but does not accept the obligation to observe the Jew-
ish commandments.87  Both the spiritual and national requirements 
should be fulfilled when a foreigner desires to convert to Judaism.88 
 
83 Responsa Maimonides 2:293. 
84 MISHNEH TORAH, Issurei Bi’ah 13:4 (“[W]hen the gentile wants to join the alliance [of 
Jews], to enter the wings of the Divine Presence and to take upon himself the burden of the 
Torah, he has to perform the acts of circumcision [and] immersion.”). 
85 Responsa Maimonides 2:293. 
86 MISHNEH TORAH, Issurei Bi’ah 14:2. 
87 ISAAC HALEVY HERZOG, The Rights of Minorities According to the Halakhah, in 2 
TECHUMIN 169, 170 n.1 (1971), A CONSTITUTION FOR ISRAEL ACCORDING TO THE TORAH 12, 
13 n.1 (1989) (“Acceptance of the Jewish national outlook which includes the faith that the 
people of Israel will return to their homeland and will reestablish Jewish sovereignty there is 
part of the Jewish belief, and the convert should adopt all the elements of this spiritual out-
look. . . . [A] foreigner who adopts the religious aspects of Judaism but has reservations 
about the acceptance of the national aspect of Judaism, which is a belief that the Jewish na-
tion will return to Zion and reestablish in this land the Jewish kingdom, cannot be accepted 
as a convert to Judaism since the belief in these principles is a fundamental element in a Jew-
ish outlook.”). 
88 See id. 2 TECHUMIN 170 n.1, A CONSTITUTION FOR ISRAEL ACCORDING TO THE TORAH 13 
n.1  (“When an individual did not accept the principles of the Jewish religion in a manner 
required in the rules pertaining to conversion—although he decided to be devoted with all of 
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Another concern of scholars of Jewish law, especially in re-
cent generations, is whether the qualifications of the Dayanim in the 
Rabbinical court are adequate.  One of the major flaws of a conver-
sion occurs when the court does not have the required qualifica-
tions.89  Orthodox Jewish law scholars frequently claim that conver-
sions performed by courts of the Conservative and Reform 
movements are not valid.  The outlook of the spiritual leaders of 
these movements concerning theological matters and their perspec-
tive in regard to the minimal standard of obligation to observe the 
Jewish commandments are not considered adequate.90 
Especially in recent generations the question of a convert’s ul-
terior motive has been scrutinized.  The main problem in this context 
is marriage-motivated conversions.  Scholars have questioned the va-
lidity of these conversions when the observance of the command-
ments of Jewish law is not the goal of the convert.  What is a desira-
ble policy for the Jewish court when it is evident that the candidate 
for conversion will not observe the commandments of Jewish law or 
will do so only partially?  Sometimes when a Jewish spouse is cohab-
iting with a non-Jew, or might cohabit with him or her in the future, 
regardless of the prohibition of this behavior in Jewish law, a Rabbin-
ical court may adopt a more lenient policy towards the conversion of 
the spouse in an attempt to avoid this serious transgression of the 
principles of Jewish law.91  When the convert accepts an obligation to 
observe all the Jewish commandments in an Orthodox court, although 
it was a conversion motivated by desire to marry a Jewish spouse, it 
is a valid conversion and all the rules pertaining to converts, includ-
ing those that prohibit a Jew from shaming him or her, still apply. 
Should this policy prevail when Jewish scholars or another 
 
his spirit and soul to the Jewish nation and to fulfill all the civil duties of members of this 
nation—he or she remains in the status of a gentile according to the principles of Jewish law, 
and cannot marry a Jewish spouse.”). 
89 A private conversion is not valid.  The act of conversion should be performed in the 
presence of three Jewish judges (Dayanim) in a Jewish court.  BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 
Yebamot 47A.  The Tosaphists explained that these judges should be present when the con-
vert accepts the burden of the commandments of Jewish law.  It is preferable that the ritual 
immersion also be performed in the presence of these judges.  However, if they are not pre-
sent, this act is de facto valid.  Id.; see also the view of Rabbi Meir Posner in Responsa Beit 
Meir 65. 
90 Responsa Achiezer 3:26; RESPONSA IGROT MOSHEH, Yoreh Deah 1:160; Yoreh Deah 
2:123; 125. 
91 RESPONSA IGROT MOSHEH, Yoreh Deah 2:124; see also Shmuel Shilo, Halakhic Lenien-
cy in Modern Responsa Regarding Conversion, 22 ISR. L. REV. 353 (1987–88). 
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/20
2015 IMMIGRATION POLICY IN ISRAEL 1111 
court find out, after the conversion, that the behavior of the convert is 
not the behavior of an observant Jew?  This issue was addressed in 
two significant decisions of the High Rabbinical Court in Israel in the 
last decade.  These decisions determine the fate of many past conver-
sions of immigrants to Israel.  In these decisions the Judges in Rab-
binical courts (Dayanim) analyzed the significance of the converts’ 
religious outlook and behavior in the period after their conversion 
and focused especially upon the issue of partial observance of the 
principles of Jewish law after the conversion.  Could a regular Rab-
binical court decide, in light of the behavior of the convert after his or 
her conversion, to invalidate the conversion by the previous court?  In 
both cases, it was not clear that the immigrant, who took upon him-
self or herself an obligation to observe the commandments of Jewish 
law before the court, actually adopted a religious outlook and ob-
served the positive and negative commandments of Judaism after the 
conversion.  Many immigrants who converted to Judaism are not 
married to observant spouses and consequently it is not easy for them 
to observe all the commandments of Jewish law after their conver-
sion. 
Sensitivity and empathy to the converts and immigrants to Is-
rael, and an attempt to avoid the undesirable consequences of a strict 
religious approach, are evident in the first decision, handed down in 
5761-2001.92  The decision of the majority in this case was written by 
the Jewish judge (Dayan) Rabbi Shlomo Daikhovsky, who was 
joined by the Jewish judge Rabbi Ezra Bar Shalom.  This case was an 
appeal on the judgment of the Dayan Izirer of the regional Rabbinical 
Court in Rechovot concerning the validity of a woman’s conversion 
in a Rabbinical court.  The Dayan Izirer emphasized that according to 
her declaration in his court, at the time of her conversion to Judaism 
she knew that she could not observe all the commandments of Jewish 
law, and her commitment before the court to observe the principles of 
Jewish law was actually limited.  Izirer found that at the time of her 
declaration, the woman believed that after her conversion she would 
be able to observe certain important commandments—the laws of 
family purity and the laws pertaining to the Sabbath and kosher 
food—and she explained that she also hoped to be able to observe 
more commandments in the future.  Therefore Dayan Izirer conclud-
 
92 See the judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 1-12-9363, issued on Aug. 3, 
2001. 
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ed that at the time of her conversion her acceptance of the com-
mandments was partial and, consequently, not sufficient.  He ruled 
that her conversion was not valid, since a fundamental element in a 
valid conversion to Judaism—acceptance of the burden of the com-
mandments of Jewish law—was missing. 
Rabbi Daikhovsky of the High Rabbinical Court did not share 
the point of view of Rabbi Izirer and adopted instead a lenient ap-
proach.  He considered it important that in this case the convert was 
accepted to the Jewish faith and nation by a qualified Orthodox Jew-
ish court.  Although we know that the motivation of a candidate for 
conversion is not appropriate—such as conversion for the sake of 
marriage or a financial or other benefit to him or her—and although 
we find out, after the conversion, that the convert violates the princi-
ples of Jewish law, since the act of conversion was performed in the 
past and the candidate for conversion was accepted into the Jewish 
community, the conversion is valid.  After the conversion, this con-
vert is a Jew.  If he or she does not observe some of the command-
ments of Jewish law, they are Jews that act in an improper manner.  
In addition, since the convert was granted the status of a Jew, his or 
her marriage to a Jewish spouse is valid.  Rabbi Daikhovsky quoted 
from the writings of Maimonides, who noted that the wives of fa-
mous Jewish leaders in the Bible, like Samson and Solomon, re-
mained with their spouses although their husbands found out, after 
their conversions, that they were idol worshippers.93  Rabbi Daikhov-
sky granted due weight to the emphasis of Maimonides—that we 
should not think, incorrectly, that “Samson, who saved the Jewish na-
tion, and Solomon, the king of Israel, who is defined in the Bible as 
‘the beloved of the Lord,’ married gentile women.”94  Although these 
wives were sinners, and violated the prohibition of idolatry after their 
conversion to Judaism, they were considered Jewish, and their Jewish 
husbands could live with them.  Their sins after their conversion did 
not invalidate their conversions. 
Rabbi Daikhovsky acknowledged that it is a different question 
before the candidate for conversion is granted the status of a Jew for 
the court that decides to convert him or her than what the legal policy 
should be in regard to the status of the convert post factum, after be-
ing accepted as a Jew.  He analyzes the text of Maimonides: 
 
93 MISHNEH TORAH, Issurei Bi’ah 13:17. 
94 See his decision, supra note 92. 
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The wives of Samson and Solomon performed the sin 
of idolatry.  This is what is written in the Bible.  Their 
conversion was problematic at the beginning of the 
process, since Maimonides wrote that “it was known 
[at the beginning of the conversion process] that they 
converted in an attempt to receive a benefit [i.e., mar-
riage to these Jewish leaders].”  In addition, “their acts 
at the end, after their conversion, proved that they [vi-
olated the commandments of Jewish law and] per-
formed [sins such as] idolatry at the beginning [imme-
diately after their conversion]” and moreover, “they 
were not converted by a [Jewish] court.”  There are 
three major problems [concerning the validity of this 
conversion].  I have no doubt that if this kind of a can-
didate for conversion would present a request to be 
accepted as a convert to the Rabbinical Court in 
Rechovot [the court of Rabbi Izirer] this court would 
rule she should not be accepted as a convert.  It is pos-
sible that I would also have joined this opinion in 
these circumstances.  Nevertheless, [after they are ac-
cepted as converts] Maimonides regards them as Jews. 
. . . [T]he status of a convert post factum, after the 
conversion, is not identical to his or her status before 
the conversion.  After the conversion has been per-
formed the conversion is valid and is not disqualified 
[in a later stage].95 
In addition, according to the perspective of Rabbi Daikhovsky, the 
convert in this case was a sincere convert.  He and Dayan Bar Sha-
lom were impressed by the honest and reliable declaration of the 
convert that she is observing the commandments of Judaism.  She ob-
served all the commandments of Judaism at the time of their decision 
in the court of appeal, and they believed she had sincerely intended to 
observe these commandments at the first stage, when she was accept-
ed as a convert.  They explained that she was sincere when she de-
clared in the court of appeal that she intended to observe all the 
commandments of Jewish law eventually.  However, since she knew 
it is difficult to observe all these commandments immediately, she 
decided it was more practical to begin by observing the main com-
 
95 Judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 1-12-9363, issued on Aug. 3, 2001. 
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mandments of Judaism, such as the rules pertaining to Kosher food, 
keeping the Sabbath, and the rules of family purity. 
These Jewish judges based their decision in this context upon 
the precedent of the ruling of a prominent Rabbi in the twentieth cen-
tury, Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodjinsky.  He decided that when a for-
eigner accepts the burden of the Jewish commandments in a partial 
manner, such as the manner of commitment in this case, the ac-
ceptance of these commandments is sufficient and the conversion is 
valid.96  When a foreigner declares that he will observe the Jewish 
commandments, but assumes that in the beginning it will be practical 
to observe only certain basic and important commandments, such as 
those mentioned in the decision of Rabbi Daikhovsky, the conversion 
is valid.  Rabbi Daikhovsky stressed that Rabbi Grodjinsky wrote that 
this could be the policy of a Rabbinical court concerning the ac-
ceptance of the commandments at the first stage—before the convert 
is accepted as a Jew.  The Dayanim Daikhovsky and Bar Shalom em-
phasized that this certainly should be the policy of this court post fac-
tum, after the conversion. 
Although it is important to assist immigrants who wish to 
convert to Judaism, we must admit that the perspective of Rabbi 
Daikhovsky could be challenged.  The convert in this case lived with 
her children and husband whom she married in a civil, not a religious, 
marriage ceremony.  Rabbi Daikhovsky explained that indeed a reli-
gious Jew should not violate the prohibition on cohabiting with an-
other Jew when they did not marry in a valid Jewish wedding cere-
mony.  However, since the woman had established a family with her 
spouse and was living with him and his children, Rabbi Daikovsky 
could understand why it was difficult for her not to violate this prohi-
bition.  He believed the focus should be upon the fact that, although 
on the one hand she cohabited with this individual, on the other hand 
she kept in a strict manner all the rules of family purity pertaining to 
her relationship with him. 
The minority point of view in this judgment, of Rabbi Abra-
ham Sherman, was based upon the assumption that if the observance 
of the commandments of Jewish law by the convert was partial, the 
conversion was not valid.  He shared the outlook of the Rabbinical 
court in Rechovot in this case that when this observance was partial, 
or even not perfect, the conversion is not valid.  Since the court knew 
 
96 Responsa Achiezer 3:26. 
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that after her conversion this convert did not observe all the rules of 
Jewish law pertaining to the Sabbath, and he believed her statement 
concerning her religious outlook did not fit with the ideology of Or-
thodox Judaism, Rabbi Sherman argued that the court should not ac-
cept her conversion as valid.  In addition, he explained that there was 
another factor which strengthened the doubts of this court about the 
validity of the conversion in this case: her cohabitation with a person 
she did not marry in an Orthodox Jewish marriage ceremony.  Ac-
cording to Rabbi Sherman, when in subsequent proceedings in anoth-
er Rabbinical court facts are revealed to the judges that cast doubt 
upon a candidate’s sincerity before the court that accepted her to the 
Jewish nation, the court should investigate, on its own initiative, 
whether the conversion performed by the Rabbinical court was valid.  
Among other reasons, this investigation is necessary because when a 
past conversion is not valid, the Rabbinical court cannot approve a 
request that a Jewish marriage ceremony be performed between the 
convert and a Jewish spouse, as a Jew cannot marry a non-Jew under 
Jewish religious law. 
The point of view of Rabbi Sherman was presented in a more 
extreme and clear-cut manner in a subsequent decision of the Rabbin-
ical court of appeals.  In this case, Rabbi Sherman, Rabbi Izirer, and 
Rabbi Sheinfeld shared the same strict point of view.97  Their deci-
sion was in an appeal on the challenge of Rabbi Atia, in the Rabbini-
cal court in Ashdod, to the lenient policy of the Rabbinical courts for 
conversion in Israel.  He attacked, in particular, the policy of Rabbi 
Drukman, who had accepted the request of the convert in this case to 
join the Jewish nation.  Rabbi Atia refused to give a woman who was 
converted in the court of Rabbi Drukman a divorce certificate be-
cause he claimed her conversion was not valid; since he stated the 
woman is not Jewish, her religious marriage to her Jewish husband 
was not valid and therefore an act of divorce would not be necessary. 
Between the lines of these arguments we can find two distinct 
attitudes towards the interpretation of the religion principles pertain-
ing to conversion: the flexible attitude and the strict attitude, dis-
guised as an attempt to achieve religious “truth.”  The strict and sus-
picious attitude pertaining to conversion of immigrants in Israel and 
the placing of significant and problematic obstacles that do not enable 
the conversion of many immigrants, their relatives, and spouses is 
 
97 See Judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 5489-64-1, issued on Oct. 2, 2008. 
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presented as an attempt to achieve religious pureness and holiness.  
But these candidates for conversion often have to pay a very high 
price as a result of this policy.  The main group that will suffer from a 
strict policy is the society of immigrants, with their relatives and 
spouses, who came to Israel as a result of a right granted to them in 
the Law of Return.  In his decision in the prior case, Rabbi Daikhov-
sky presented the suffering and humiliation of candidates for conver-
sion in Israel, especially from weak segments of society, in a persua-
sive manner.  He explained that when a proselyte has converted to 
Judaism in an ordinary Rabbinical court or in a special court for con-
version, and he approaches a regular Rabbinical court in subsequent 
litigation, such as to request the division of an estate between the in-
heritors or property between the spouses or a divorce suit: 
[C]an each [Rabbinical] court be free to investigate 
[what is the legal status of the convert] . . . and deter-
mine he is not a Jew?  And what if his children or 
grandchildren need [the services of the] Rabbinical 
courts, could all courts examine their legal status [as 
Jews] until 1000 generations?  Can we torture the 
convert anytime he or his descendants need [the ser-
vices of] a Rabbinical court for any purpose? . . . . I 
think that repeated investigation of such a sensitive 
matter and the continuation of this investigation in fu-
ture generations . . . could result in a problematic situ-
ation of torture and abuse [of converts and their chil-
dren].98 
Rabbinical courts for conversion can investigate, on their own 
initiative, whether a candidate for conversion is sincere.  But after 
they decide they are accepting a candidate and they state he is a Jew, 
further investigation of the convert’s behavior is unnecessary and 
humiliating.  Such a lenient policy is in the spirit of the sensitivity of 
Jewish law and the concern in Judaism over the appropriate relation-
ship between one individual and another.  Recognizing this, the Su-
preme Court of Israel has sometimes sided with Jewish immigrant 
groups who were adversely affected by the policy of the Rabbinate or 
the Rabbinical courts regarding their conversion.99 
 
98 Judgment of the High Rabbinical Court in case 1-12-9363, issued on Aug. 3, 2001. 
99 See HCJ 230/86 Shoshanah (Susan) Miller v. The Minister of Interior [1986] IsrSC 
40(4) 436, 447–48. 
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The outcome of an investigation into the real intentions of a 
candidate for conversion can be cruel to the candidate and his or her 
children.  Truth is a value in Jewish law.  However, there are also 
other important values in Judaism.  A verse in the Book of Proverbs 
says about the ways of the Torah (Biblical Jewish Law) that “[i]ts 
ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are paths of peace.”100  
In light of this verse, the Babylonian Talmud concluded that “the 
[goal of the] whole Torah [also its purpose] is to promote peace.”101  
From this point of view, peace is one of the most important principles 
of Judaism and it constitutes an ideological foundation for all the 
commandments of the Torah.  Other verses in the Torah praise an in-
dividual who walks in the paths of peace.102  The competing values of 
truth and peace should be balanced in Jewish law in an appropriate 
manner.  An important Jewish text states “truth, and judgment of 
peace you shall judge in your cities.”103  Rabbi Kook emphasized that 
in a deep sense, truth and peace coincide in Judaism: “[I]t is all one 
Torah.  The peace aims to [achieve] the [deeper] truth.  [Peace] is not 
[a] concession about the [definition of the] truth but [a] precision on 
it [in a deeper understanding of truth] and justice derives from the 
peace.”104 
Hillel, an important Rabbi in the ancient period, attributed 
significance to peace: “Hillel would say: Be a disciple of Aaron—a 
lover of peace, a pursuer of peace, one who loves human beings and 
draws them close to the Torah.”105  An ancient Jewish text states that 
scholars of Jewish law, including the Dayanim in Rabbinical courts, 
 
100 Proverbs 3:17. 
101 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gitin 59:72. 
102 E.g., Psalms 37:37 (“Observe the innocent and see the upright, for there is a future for 
the man of peace.”); Proverbs 12:20 (“There is deceit in the heart of those who plot evil, but 
for the counselors of peace there is joy.”); 1 Chronicles 22:7–10 (“And David said to Solo-
mon, ‘My son, as for me, it was in my heart to build a House in the name of the Lord my G-
od.  But the word of the Lord was upon me, saying: “You have shed much blood, and you 
have waged great wars; you shall not build a House in My Name because you have shed 
much blood to the ground before Me.  Behold a son will be born to you; he will be a man of 
peace, and I shall give him peace from all his enemies around about, for Solomon will be his 
name, and I shall give peace and quiet to Israel in his days.  He shall build a House in My 
Name, and he shall be to Me as a son, and I to him as a Father, and I shall prepare the throne 
of his kingdom forever.” ’ ”). 
103 Zechariah 8:16. 
104 2 IGROT HARAYAH 294 (1985); see also 1 IGROT HARAYAH 174 (1985) (“The truth can-
not be partial; the truth has to be comprehensive.”). 
105 MISHNA, Ethics of the Fathers 1:12. 
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should enhance peace in the world.106 
The path of Hillel, preferring peace over the strict and un-
compromising “truth,” conflicted with the strict and rigid path of an-
other scholar named Shammai.  Among other things, these two schol-
ars disagreed regarding the policy of accepting converts to the Jewish 
nation: 
Our Rabbis taught: A certain heathen [the candidate 
for conversion] once came before Shammai and asked 
him, “How many Torahs have you?”  “Two,” he re-
plied, “the Written Torah and the Oral Torah.”  “I be-
lieve you with respect to the Written, but not with re-
spect to the Oral Torah; make me a convert on 
condition that you teach me the Written Torah [only].”  
[But Shammai] scolded and repulsed him in anger.  
When [the candidate for conversion] went before Hil-
lel, he accepted him as a convert.  On the first day, he 
taught him, Alef, beth, gimmel, daleth [the first four 
letters of the Hebrew alphabet]; the following day 
[Hillel] reversed [them] to him.  “But yesterday you 
did not teach them to me thus,” he protested.  “Must 
you then not rely upon me [Hillel]?  Then rely upon 
me with respect to the Oral [Torah] too.” 
On another occasion it happened that a certain 
heathen [the candidate for conversion] came before 
Shammai and said to him, “Make me a convert, on 
condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I 
stand on one foot.”  Thereupon [Shammai] repulsed 
him with the builder’s cubit which was in his hand.  
When he went before Hillel, he said to him, “ ‘What is 
hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor;’ that is the 
whole Torah, while the rest is the commentary there-
of; go and learn it.” 
On another occasion it happened that a certain 
heathen [the candidate for conversion] was passing 
behind the Beth Hamidrash [a Jewish academy of 
learning], when he heard the voice of a teacher recit-
ing, “and these are the garments which they shall 
 
106 Bamidbar Rabbah 11:18. 
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make; a breastplate and an ephod.”  Said he, “For 
whom are these?”  “For the High Priest,” he was told.  
Then said that heathen to himself, “I will go and be-
come a convert, that I may be appointed to a High 
Priest.”  So he went before Shammai and said to him, 
“Make me a convert on condition that you appoint me 
as a High Priest” [an ulterior motive].  But he repulsed 
him with the builder’s cubit which was in his hand.  
[The candidate for conversion] then went before Hil-
lel, who accepted him as a convert.  Said he to him, 
“Can any man be made a king but he who knows the 
arts of government?  Do you go and study the arts of 
government!”  He went and read.  When he came to 
“and the stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to 
death,” he asked him, “To whom does this verse ap-
ply?”  “Even to David King of Israel” was the answer.  
Thereupon the convert reasoned within himself a for-
tiori: if Israel, who are called sons of the Omnipresent, 
and who in his love for them He designated them, “Is-
rael is My son, My firstborn,” yet it is written of them, 
“and the stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to 
death,” how much more so a mere convert, who comes 
with his staff and wallet! . . . He went before Hillel 
and said to him, “O gentle Hillel, blessings rest on thy 
head for bringing me under the wings of the 
Shekhinah [Divine Presence]!”  Some time later the 
three [converts] met in one place; said they, “Sham-
mai’s impatience sought to drive us from the world, 
but Hillel’s gentleness brought us under the wings of 
the Shekhinah.”107 
In three cases Shammai does not want to convert the candi-
date since this candidate is not willing to accept the whole burden of 
the Jewish commandments.  Among other things, in his opinion, it is 
forbidden to convert a person who only wants to learn the Written 
Torah and not the Oral Torah, or a person who wants to learn the 
whole Torah while standing on one foot.  In these cases Hillel is 
ready to convert the candidate even though his conversion is not 
complete at the first stage.  In one case, when the convert stood on 
 
107 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sabbath 31:2. 
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one foot, Hillel told him that “What is hateful to you, do not do to 
your neighbor” is a principle that summarizes the whole Torah and 
that the rest of the commandments are an interpretation of this princi-
ple.  He trusted the convert and saw the good potential in him and be-
lieved that in the future he would investigate the deep meaning of the 
principle he taught him and observe all the commandments as a result 
of his learning what he is commanded and not commanded to do. 
The path of peace—the path of Hillel—is preferable.  This 
perspective of Jewish law and the perspective of enhancing autono-
my, human liberty, and freedom coincide, leading to the same con-
clusion: the lenient approach is preferable in the sphere of conversion 
of immigrants and other members of weaker segments in Israeli soci-
ety. 
VI. THE PERSPECTIVE OF GENDER 
Most of the converts to Judaism in Israel are women.  This 
could be the result of many factors, including the rule in Jewish law 
that the religious identity of a Jew is determined by his or her mother.  
A son or daughter of a Jewish mother is a Jew.  Most of those who 
could benefit from the moderate approach concerning requirements 
for conversion are therefore women.  A more lenient interpretation of 
the Jewish law of conversion can assist especially these female im-
migrants and their daughters. 
Interpretation of Jewish law in an attempt to assist women 
was the policy of the Supreme Court Justice Menachem Elon in the 
Shakdiel case.108  Local religious councils in Israel provide Jewish re-
ligious services to the local residents.  The members of the religious 
councils are nominated by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the local 
Chief Rabbis, and the existing council members.  In this case, the lo-
cal Chief Rabbi opposed the nomination of Leah Shakdiel, a woman, 
to the religious council of her town.  He claimed Jewish law forbids a 
woman from holding a post as a member of a religious council.  The 
two Chief Rabbis of Israel and the Chief Rabbinate of Israel support-
ed this point of view.  In this case, the Supreme Court believed that 
the exclusion of a woman from membership in a religious council is 
gender discrimination.  Justice Elon adopted an internal solution, 
within the boundaries of Jewish law.  He did not state that the exter-
 
108 HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221. 
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nal principle of gender equality overrides the religious view that 
women cannot be members of religious councils.  Instead, he focused 
upon two possible interpretations to the question: Does Jewish law 
enable women to be members of religious councils?  Although the 
Chief Rabbinate of Israel was not in favor of the nomination of wom-
en as members in religious councils, Justice Elon weighed the evi-
dence and concluded, “There is strong support within halakhic [Jew-
ish law] framework itself, for the view that the petitioner, as a 
woman, should not be barred from membership of a religious coun-
cil.”109 
A similar approach can assist females who are candidates for 
conversion in Israel.  The adoption of the lenient approach within 
Jewish law—the approach of Rabbi Daikhovsky—can enable more 
candidates to fulfill their dream to be Jews. 
VII. FEMINISM AND MULTICULTURALISM 
Multiculturalism is common in many liberal democratic so-
cieties today.  Presently residing in these societies, side by side, are 
individuals from different ethnic, racial, and religious groups.  The 
ideology, outlook, values, and religion of members of different 
groups are not identical.  While the state or the courts must balance 
these groups’ contrasting interests and values, those who grant due 
respect to multiculturalism wish to secure recognition and representa-
tion of the variety of interests and values of all ethnic, racial, and re-
ligious groups in society.110 
Society should protect minority groups, especially when they 
have special cultural or religious values.  The majority should not si-
lence the voice of the minority.  But should controversial values be 
safeguarded?  If we take multiculturalism seriously, they should be 
safeguarded in order to accomplish the basic goal of the liberal dem-
ocratic society: equal recognition and representation for all members 
 
109 Id. at 247–71. 
110 See Amy Gutman, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION 3 (Amy Gutman ed., 1992); Isaak Dore & Michael T. Carper, Multicultural-
ism, Pluralism, and Pragmatism: Political Gridlock or Theoretical Impasse?, 10 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 71, 73 (2002).  Regarding the value of preserving 
the culture of different groups, see also Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and 
the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 
in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 251 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle 
eds., 1994); Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW 
AND SOCIETY 247 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). 
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of society.  Presently, this mission has not been fully accomplished, 
since in many liberal democratic societies there are some groups with 
special values.  They are not the mainstream in these societies and 
suffer from lack of representation or misrepresentation.  The goal of 
proponents of liberal democratic societies should be the elimination 
of all forms of inequality.  We can achieve this goal by recognizing 
the unique values and ideology of all groups.111  The liberal point of 
view requires that all cultural groups in society will be granted equal 
legitimacy and should all be treated with due respect and tolerance.112  
We should grant each cultural group in society an equal opportunity 
to determine its own aspirations, customs, and values, which are the 
basic outcomes of its ideology.  A group should be able to express it-
self without unnecessary constraints or deprivation.113 
The difficulty in implementing multiculturalism arises when-
ever the cultural claims and cultural values of different groups con-
tradict one another.  Sometimes, as the result of liberal humanistic 
outlook, society wishes to protect the values and ideology of a con-
servative group although its values and ideology are contradictory to 
 
111 Dore & Carper, supra note 110, at 78.  Some scholars reject the opinion discussed ear-
lier regarding tolerance and respect for the values of different cultures.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. 
BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 313 
(1997).  Bork questions the status granted to multiculturalism in society and law in the Unit-
ed States.  In his opinion, this status might cause a split within American society.  In addi-
tion, it could result in the devaluation of the central cultural values of American society.  He 
also expressed concern that American culture could devolve towards the undesirable charac-
teristics of the barbarian society. 
112 See STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 60–63 (1999).  Fish makes a distinc-
tion between two forms of multiculturalism: boutique multiculturalism and strong multicul-
turalism.  The first form is characterized by a sympathetic yet superficial approach towards 
the culture of others.  This is the multiculturalism of “boutiques,” which welcomes ethnic 
food of different groups in the population.  On the superficial level, it declares that it accepts 
the culture of others.  However, when the values or conduct of others contradict the values of 
the individual who claims he adheres to this form of multiculturalism, he rejects them.  Bou-
tique multiculturalism is based upon the assumption that the cultural values of others should 
not be accepted when such acceptance conflicts with the values of the cultural group of those 
adhering to this form of multiculturalism.  In these circumstances, the beliefs and convic-
tions of those adhering to boutique multiculturalism are superior. 
 The other form of multiculturalism is based upon a commitment to promote special char-
acteristics of the cultural values and customs of others, in an attempt to prevent discrimina-
tion among cultures.  However, Fish stresses that this form of multiculturalism is also not 
absolute, as respect and tolerance towards the values of an intolerant culture becomes prob-
lematic.  The adherent to this form of multiculturalism could probably choose to be intoler-
ant to the values of the intolerant culture (such as fundamental Islam) on behalf of a common 
consensus on the values of his dominant culture.  However, when he desires to act in this 
manner, his policy is actually not strong multiculturalism but boutique multiculturalism. 
113 Dore & Carper, supra note 110, at 78. 
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those of the liberal Western society.114  Here, there may be a signifi-
cant tension between the desire to enhance tolerance and equal treat-
ment of women, and multiculturalism, which respects and tolerates 
the practices and ideology of all groups in society—including more 
traditional and religious groups that may adhere to traditional patterns 
of control and authority over women.115 
What is the optimal approach for those who strive to promote 
the values of feminism in a multicultural society?  What should be 
the policy of a liberal democratic society when ethnic groups or reli-
gious groups, or some other segments of society, preserve or promote 
patriarchal power structures?  Proponents of multiculturalism have 
suggested several formulas for balancing between multiculturalism 
and feminism.  Some have held that there should be more emphasis 
on multiculturalism.  Their commitment to multiculturalism led to 
their conclusion that some aspirations of the feminist movement are 
impossible in a situation where feminism and multiculturalism 
clash.116 
A second solution to this dilemma is based upon the assump-
tion that protection should at times be granted to cultures that treat 
men and women unequally, including those that preserve biased legal 
arrangements regarding the relationships between men and women.  
However, this protection should be granted to these cultures only 
when they are at risk of extinction.117 
A third approach suggests it is possible and appropriate to 
promote both multiculturalism and feminism at the same time.  The 
 
114 Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion, and Multiculturalism in Israel, 5 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 339, 340–41 (2000). 
115 MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 65 (1999); Sherifa Zuhur, Empowering Women or 
Dislodging Sectarianism?: Civil Marriage in Lebanon, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 199 
(2002). 
116 See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 
69 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 2000); Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural 
Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105, 127 (1992); Chandran Kukathas, Is Feminism Bad for Multi-
culturalism?, 15 PUB. AFF. 83 (2001).  Kukathas held that the state should demonstrate toler-
ance towards a variety of cultures, despite the fact that an outcome of this policy could be 
tolerance towards patriarchal patterns of behavior. 
117 See generally Margalit & Halbertal, supra note 27.  The authors’ position in this matter 
is opposed to that of scholars who believe that cultures denying gender equality should be 
replaced by egalitarian societies.  Nevertheless, some of these scholars were realistic, sof-
tened their position, and supported a more moderate approach—acting on the inside—that 
would achieve the desirable change in the field of gender equality without replacing the an-
cient society.  See Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 9 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). 
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desired outcome is to strike a reasonable balance between multicul-
turalism and feminism on a case-by-case basis.118 
The past solutions to the dilemma of finding a desirable bal-
ance between multiculturalism and feminism were a sincere attempt 
to grant due weight to both philosophies.  However, this goal can be 
reached today by taking an alternate approach that could enhance and 
promote a desirable balance between multiculturalism and feminism.  
Scholars and policymakers can focus upon a dynamic internal solu-
tion within the framework of the relevant religion’s evolution.  The 
adherents of feminism should initiate dialogues with spiritual leaders 
of those groups that preserve patriarchal rules and traditional practic-
es and attempt to convince them that they could and should interpret 
their religious laws in a manner that will enhance the best interests of 
women. 
The feminist political philosopher Susan M. Okin would not 
agree with such a solution, arguing that it grants too much weight to 
multiculturalism by preserving patriarchal principles and conduct.  
Okin would argue that feminism should be afforded more weight, as 
it seeks to promote respect and equality for all individuals.119  Never-
theless, she concedes that we can justify the protection of certain as-
pects of a minority culture, such as its language, and should attempt 
to be empathetic when cultural groups implement legitimate cultural 
practices and rules that are different from those of the majority cul-
ture.120 
The approach of Professor Ruth Halperin-Kaddari is similar 
 
118 Will Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, 
supra note 117, at 31.  Kymlicka adheres to a proper balance between different, colliding 
values and rights, including a possible conflict between multiculturalism and human rights.  
In his opinion, there are limitations imposed upon the cultural rights of those who belong to 
minority groups, as a result of the relevance of principles such as freedom, democracy, and 
social justice.  See also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF MINORITY RIGHTS 76 (1996). 
119 Okin, supra note 117, at 9. 
120 See id. at 18, 23.  In the author’s opinion the liberal approach which leads to the justifi-
cations of multiculturalism should be balanced with the fear that support of multiculturalism 
means support of patriarchy and damage to women.  Okin’s basic position is shared by Leti 
Volpp, a feminist scholar who believes that as a matter of principle, feminism should be the 
paramount consideration when we cannot resolve the conflict between feminism and the cul-
tural principles of certain groups of immigrants to the United States, although Volpp believes 
that all cultures are patriarchal.  In these groups, customs such as marriage of young girls are 
commonly an outcome of unequal power relations between men and women.  See Leti 
Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89, 105–06 (2000); Leti 
Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1573 (1996). 
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to that of Okin.  She argues that the fact that women choose to belong 
to a group that implements unequal and oppressive norms towards 
them does not justify their oppression and discrimination.  Yet, she 
shares Okin’s opinion that an effort should be made to promote the 
status of women in their group through a creative use of the group 
norms, including the interpretation of its rules.121  Okin and Halperin-
Kaddari granted more weight to feminism but did not choose the ap-
proach of direct confrontation with the traditional and religious 
groups and their norms.  They were realistic and did not want to en-
danger the positive results that the nascent feminist movement had 
already achieved for women in these groups.  While holding femi-
nism to be paramount, they avoided the external path—a total attack 
on traditional groups and their patriarchal rules and practices.  Their 
goal was to find an optimal solution for women who choose to belong 
to these groups.122 
The tension between multiculturalism and feminism as dis-
cussed above was presented in a manner relevant to the reality of 
many liberal democratic countries.  However, there is a significant 
distinction between the analysis of the relationship between multicul-
turalism and feminism in Israel and the analysis of this issue in other 
countries, such as the United States and Canada.  In the latter coun-
tries, the main problem consists of the patriarchal practices of minori-
ty populations.  Taking multiculturalism seriously, the state should 
grant protection to the minority culture.  The culture of the majority 
should not suppress or extinguish that of the minority.  The legal sit-
uation is different in the State of Israel.123  Recognized religious sects 
and their religious courts hold sole or parallel jurisdiction in the law 
of the State of Israel in matters of personal status.  In certain matters, 
such as the marriage and divorce of Jews, an exclusive jurisdiction 
had been granted to the Rabbinical courts.  The relevant principles of 
Jewish law are applied in these courts and interpreted by a traditional 
group—the religious judges, Dayanim—who are trained in Orthodox 
religious institutions and share a conservative approach to the bound-
aries of legitimate interpretation of Jewish law.  Consequently, the 
 
121 Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 342. 
122 Such “external” direct attack could result in the adoption of uncompromising policies 
in the religious community that resists what it conceives as “coercion” from the outside.  The 
result of the adoption of these policies might be stronger opposition in the religious commu-
nity to new interpretation of religious law in light of the contemporary ideology of gender 
equality in modern society. 
123 Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 342. 
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process of balancing between multiculturalism and feminism in Israel 
should be different from that in nations such as the United States and 
Canada. 
Indeed, the religious customs and practices of Orthodox Jews 
in Israel are those of a minority culture, but it is not a minority at risk 
of extinction.  On the contrary, this culture is granted enforceable le-
gal power in Rabbinical courts.  It can coerce individuals from the 
minority and the majority to adhere to principles of Jewish law that 
are sometimes patriarchal.  The State of Israel granted a conservative 
minority group the power to implement its ideology in one of the 
more significant areas of family law—marriage and divorce of 
Jews—and sometimes this power is granted to this group in other 
matters of personal status, such as custody and guardianship of chil-
dren.  In this regard, the majority population in Israel could be sub-
jected to the ideology and legal practices of the minority.  According 
to liberal ideology, this policy is controversial.  It could potentially 
violate human rights, which are granted to all individuals living in the 
country.  Some claim that this policy is unacceptable for the majority 
of Jews in Israel who do not belong to the conservative religious 
group.  A minority ideology cannot justify the price many Jews in Is-
rael pay in the domain of human rights and liberal values in many 
spheres, including equality between the sexes.124 
There are some religious Jews in Israel who are also feminists 
and argue that the implementation of Jewish legal principles, which 
are not always egalitarian,125 in Israeli Rabbinical courts is problem-
atic from the feminist perspective because it results in application of 
unequal rules in regulating the relationship between men and wom-
en.126 
The Israeli legislature, however, has chosen to grant binding 
status to the principles of this conservative religious group and has 
 
124 Liora Bilski, Cultural Import: The Case of Feminism in Israel, 25 TEL AVIV UNIV. L. 
REV. 523, 561–62 (2002); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Legal Pluralism in Israel and the Rabbin-
ical Courts in Israel After the Court Verdicts of Bavli and Lev, 20 TEL AVIV UNIV. L. REV. 
683, 745 (1997); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, More About Legal Pluralism in Israel, 23 TEL 
AVIV UNIV. L. REV. 559, 567 (2000). 
125 Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 352. 
126 See id. at 348–52.  In the author’s opinion, the division of roles and spheres of activity 
between men and women, which is an outcome of the patriarchal family structure, is rein-
forced in the Israeli legal system as a result of the legal importance granted to principles of 
Jewish law on marriage and divorce.  See also Halperin-Kaddari, More About Legal Plural-
ism in Israel, supra note 124, at 567–71 (discussing the “dark side” of legal pluralism, which 
portrays an inherent confrontation between liberalism and pluralism). 
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reaffirmed this legal practice by renewing its validity.  In 1992, the 
Knesset enacted two important constitutional laws—Basic Law: Hu-
man Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.  
These Basic Laws preserved all the rules of law enacted in the past, 
including rules that incorporated, implicitly or explicitly, unequal re-
ligious principles that sometimes discriminate against women.  In ad-
dition, Israel’s current political reality makes it unlikely that any at-
tempt in the Knesset to enact new rules which will change the 
aforementioned foundations of family law will be successful. 
In Israel’s unique reality, what is the proper balance between 
multiculturalism and feminism?  An interpretation of Jewish law that 
takes into consideration the special needs and aspirations of women is 
the more realistic alternative.  Such an interpretation can elevate the 
legal status of Jewish women in Israel in legal matters that are within 
the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical courts.  It is not surprising that reli-
gious feminist scholars in Israel prefer the “internal” mode of ac-
tion—reform within the religious constraints of Orthodox Judaism.  
These scholars believe that this mode of action can produce an effec-
tive result for those who wish to enhance the power and rights of 
Jewish women in the Rabbinical courts.127 
Religious feminists, such as Israel’s Orthodox Jewish women, 
prefer the “internal” solution because it coincides with their religious 
beliefs.  The radical, “external” approach attempts to uproot power 
structures in society, religion, and culture, thereby challenging the 
foundations, morals, and principles of the religious establishment and 
religious ideology.  Religious women prefer efforts to bridge and 
compromise, as much as possible, between feminism and religion.  
These women, including religious Jewish feminists, are aware of the 
fact that their mission is problematic at present.  They must face the 
difficulty resulting from their double fidelity: the commitment to a 
life of faith versus their loyalty to humanistic values of liberty and 
equality.128  One activist has stated that religious Jewish feminist 
women today are faced with the following dilemma: from the femi-
nist viewpoint, is it possible that the Torah, which Jews believe dis-
plays eternal truth, lacks the egalitarian perception and the values that 
feminist women cherish so much today?129  The religious conviction 
of these women leads them to conclude that it is unacceptable to re-
 
127 See Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 344–45, 365. 
128 Hanna Kehat, Breaking the Patriarchal Circle, 22 PANIM 23, 28 (2002). 
129 Rivkah Lubitz, The Pain of Tzlophad’s Daughters, 22 PANIM 129, 133 (2002). 
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gard the Torah as being old and irrelevant to modern women.  These 
women are believers and are committed to an ideology that the Torah 
is the eternal truth.130 
Performing an “internal” act within a religious society can 
lead to a change that will be accepted by both the religious establish-
ment and religious feminists.  We can derive this conclusion from the 
struggle that led to the granting of the status of Toa’anot rabaniyot to 
women in Israel.  Toa’anot rabaniyot are Orthodox Jewish women 
who are capable of implementing their knowledge of Jewish law 
when they represent their clients—many times women—in legal pro-
ceedings before the Rabbinical courts.  Originally, only men could 
represent clients in legal proceedings in these courts.  When women 
wished to enter this profession and requested authorization to repre-
sent clients in the Rabbinical courts, they encountered strong opposi-
tion from sections of the Jewish religious community in Israel, in-
cluding some of the Dayanim.  As a result, women had to overcome 
various obstacles and resistance.  When women pushed to obtain the 
requisite licenses to represent clients before these courts, the scope of 
the requirements was expanded and the difficulty level of the exams 
was heightened.  Women who were preparing for the exams were not 
given proper information regarding the material they were required to 
study.  Many Toanim rabaniyim—men who represent clients in Rab-
binical courts—refused to accept women as interns, thereby denying 
women the necessary experience.  Some of the Dayanim prohibited 
women from sitting in court as spectators, so they could not learn 
practical aspects of litigation procedure and evidence, which they 
would need to implement when they represented clients in the court-
room.131  Nevertheless, women were successful in their struggle and 
eventually received the accreditation to be Toa’anot rabaniyot. 
This is perceived by some scholars as a feminist achievement 
within the boundaries set by Jewish law and the Jewish religious es-
tablishment.  Toa’anot rabaniyot, as women who are dedicated to 
their religious conviction, did not wish to undermine the religious 
system of the Rabbinical courts.  They had to operate within the limi-
 
130 See id. at 134. 
131 Ronen Shamir, Michal Shitrai & Nelly Elias, Mission, Feminism and Professionalism: 
Toa’anot Rabaniyot in the Orthodox Community, 38 MEGAMOT 313, 328–29 (1997); see also 
Bilski, supra note 124, at 561–62 (interpreting the struggle of the Toa’anot Rabaniyot for 
recognition of their status as a feminist struggle); Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114, at 354–
56. 
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tations set by the religion and the religious establishment.  Since this 
establishment can be hostile to the feminist movement, they some-
times had to publicly claim they were not part of this movement.132  
In addition, they emphasized that they were dedicated to a religious 
ideology and lifestyle.133  However, their accreditation and work on 
behalf of women in the Rabbinical courts is de facto a feminist 
achievement. 
The rest of the world follows a similar pattern.  The difficulty 
experienced by Orthodox Jewish women—who wish to combine their 
personal outlook that women should promote their own status in so-
ciety and law as much as possible together with their religious com-
mitment—is not a phenomenon unique to Judaism. 
This aspiration to enhance women’s rights in a traditional re-
ligious society is also evident in the writings of some Muslim wom-
en.  Certain rules of Islamic law and the practices of Islamic society 
reflect the fact that in several domains Muslim women retain an infe-
rior status.134  Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to implement a pol-
icy of compromise between feminism and Islamic ideology.  It is not 
a simple task to convince Muslim spiritual leaders that they can and 
should interpret Islamic law in an attempt to enhance the status of 
Muslim women.  Fundamentalist Muslims will reject “external” in-
fluences, but moderate forces within Islam may welcome an attempt 
to interpret Islamic law in a manner that will produce a common de-
nominator between the feminist Western outlook and the religious 
perspectives of Muslim law.135 
Some have claimed that the international standards concern-
ing the status of women in law and society, adopted by the interna-
tional community as a response to the initiative of Western states, 
contradict the basic principles of Islam and therefore the effort to 
promote these standards should be conceived as an imperialistic, anti-
Islamic attempt to subject Islamic society to foreign attitudes.  These 
 
132 Shamir et al., supra note 131, at 331. 
133 Id. 
134 Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future Legal Status of 
Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 149, 157–61 (1994). 
135 See Aziza Al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights, 12 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1997); Sajeda Amin & Sara Hossain, Religious and Cultural 
Rights: Women’s Reproductive Rights and the Politics of Fundamentalism: A View From 
Bangladesh, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1319 (1995); Abdullahi Ahmed An-N’aim, Human Rights in 
the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990). 
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scholars held that the judgment of Islamic lifestyle through a Western 
prism is actually a control mechanism used by the world’s powerful 
groups in developed countries.
 136  These groups oppress and suppress 
the traditional ideology of the Islamic countries and use their power 
in an attempt to silence the voice of the weaker segments of society 
in the world.  Many Islamic countries opposed the concept of adopt-
ing new trends in Islamic law in light of Western feminist ideology.  
These Islamic countries regard this as a revolution from the outside, 
using the enhancement of women’s liberty as a justification for impo-
sition of foreign and problematic ideas.  Scholars sometimes believe 
that the assumption that feminism should be the dominant ideology in 
these circumstances is similar, to an extent, to the viewpoint of some 
Western women during the colonial period, who believed that coloni-
alism was positive since it improved the legal and social status of 
women in the colonies.  These Western women stressed that the nec-
essary mission of colonial powers was to import the values of the 
Western civilization into “backward” societies.137 
Presently, the objection to the trend of importing Western 
feminist ideology to Muslim societies is based upon the assumption 
that the goal of the feminist movement today is the implementation of 
“external” Western norms onto Muslim women.  This opposition to 
feminist influences is presented as an objection to Western domi-
nance, which is viewed as a threat to the preservation of authentic Is-
lamic culture.  These opponents claim that their objection stems from 
their sensitivity and due respect to the values of Muslim societies that 
wish to preserve Islamic women’s traditional lifestyle.138  In addition, 
in a number of cases in the past, the Western pressure of trying to 
improve the status of Muslim women was counterproductive, as it 
sometimes caused the toughening of traditional standards and prac-
tices common in these societies in reaction.  Many times the external 
pressure resulted in a tendency to reject the basic foundations of the 
Western women’s equal rights movement altogether.139 
 
136 Deniz Kandiyoti, Introduction to WOMEN, ISLAM, AND THE STATE 1, 7 (Deniz Kandiyo-
ti ed., 1991). 
137 See ANTOINETTE BURTON, BURDENS OF HISTORY: BRITISH FEMINISTS, INDIAN WOMEN, 
AND IMPERIAL CULTURE 1865–1915 (1994); VRON WARE, BEYOND THE PALE: WHITE 
WOMEN, RACISM, AND HISTORY 156–67 (1992); WESTERN WOMEN AND IMPERIALISM: 
COMPLICITY AND RESISTANCE (Nupur Chaudhuri & Margaret Strobel eds., 1992). 
138 See Kandiyoti, supra note 136, at 8. 
139 Regarding Muslim society’s attitude towards the new agenda of women’s human 
rights, see SHAHEEN SARDAR ALI, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM AND 
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One opponent to the implementation of Western feminist ide-
ology in Muslim society was the scholar Al-Hibri.  She investigated 
women’s status in Islamic culture and claimed that Okin’s balance 
between traditional religious ideologies and the conflicting outlook of 
feminism was not appropriate.  Her criticism was that Okin did not 
grant due weight to traditional religious ideology.  She also claimed 
that the weight of multiculturalism should be more significant when it 
is balanced against feminism.  In her opinion, Okin granted too much 
weight to the fact that certain principles in the Islamic world and reli-
gion promoted the dominance and authority of men over women.140  
Al-Hibri stressed that a feminist perspective in favor of reform in 
Muslim countries or within groups of Muslim immigrants in Western 
countries should always be balanced by the counter-perspective: re-
spect for the religious and cultural principles of Muslims.  She was 
under the impression that Okin silenced the authentic voice of Mus-
lim women and that the adoption of her policy infringed upon their 
freedom of expression.  According to Al-Hibri, Muslim women 
should be given a fair opportunity to express their original voice.  Her 
criticism was that Okin enabled this voice to be heard only when it 
coincided with the dominant concepts of Western feminism that 
shape policy in liberal democratic societies.  Al-Hibri claimed that 
the imposition of Western feminist concepts upon the populations in 
Muslim countries and Muslims in Western countries was an attempt 
to oppress their Islamic culture.  She believed that this approach 
stemmed from a patronizing agenda that is implemented by the 
world’s majority and by multicultural societies upon Muslim mem-
bers in minority groups.141 
Some critics even claimed that the attempt to impose Western 
principles on groups that adhere to a conservative agenda regarding 
women is an act of arrogance.  According to these critics, the imposi-
tion of values from the outside stems from a lack of respect and toler-
ance towards the beliefs and choices of the women belonging to these 
groups.142  They held that this strong paternalistic approach is a sub-
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EQUAL BEFORE ALLAH, UNEQUAL BEFORE MAN? 24–49, 220–46 
(2000). 
140 Aziza Y. Al-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority 
Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 117, at 41, 42. 
141 See id. at 41–46. 
142 David M. Smolin, Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of Cultural 
Genocide?: The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender, 12 J.L. 
& RELIGION 143, 171 (1995–96). 
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stantial danger to human freedom since it does not enable these 
women—who wish to act as they please in the fundamental aspects 
of their lives, such as religion, family, parenting, and education—to 
live according to their convictions.143 
The tension between the desire of women to belong to a tradi-
tional patriarchal society and the attempt of the feminist movement to 
“save” them from the hegemony of men in their society exists not on-
ly in regard to Muslim communities in Western countries, but also in 
regard to female members of other conservative communities, such as 
ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups in the United States, including two 
groups: Chasidey Satmer and Lubavitch.144  From the feminist per-
spective, women who maintain a religious Jewish patriarchal lifestyle 
desire to preserve this tradition as a result of “false consciousness.”145  
However, men and women who choose this path sometimes claim 
that this attitude is an insult and this accusation about their mental 
awareness requires empirical proof, since they have adopted a reli-
gious and conservative ideology with full awareness and conscious-
ness.  They perceive their opponents’ low evaluation of their choice 
to adopt a traditional lifestyle as a lack of appreciation and due re-
spect for their intelligence.  There are millions of women in all re-
gions of the world who adhere to a religious or traditional ideology, 
and believe it is a very important and meaningful guideline for their 
lives.146 
Several scholars have claimed that Western society should 
take seriously the feelings, conviction, and choice of traditional and 
religious women.  The principles of many religions today and their 
ideological foundations should not be utterly rejected by feminists 
claiming that religion oppresses women.  They suggested that wom-
en’s struggles for the increase of equality and the narrowing of power 
gaps between men and women should be the preferable policy.147  
 
143 Id. at 170. 
144 Id. at 158, 163. 
145 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Public Discourse, Religion, and Women’s Struggles for 
Justice, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1088 (2002). 
146 Cf. CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OPPRESSION 
151 (1989); Fiorenza, supra note 145, at 1084; see also Emily Fowler Hartigan, Practicing 
and Professing Spirit in Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1165, 1167–68 (1996) (regarding a 
Catholic woman in the United States, who encountered hostility from feminist scholars as a 
result of her religious belief and approach to current society). 
147 Fiorenza, supra note 145, at 1084; Farida Shaheed, The Cultural Articulation of Patri-
archy: Legal System, Islam and Woman, 6 S. ASIA BULL. 43 (1986). 
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However, feminism should be implemented in a cautious manner.  
Feminists should advance their agenda, but also reflect in their ac-
tions a desired understanding and respect for the religious culture in 
which many women wish to act.  The feminist movement should not 
oppose or exclude the principles of religion, or ignore them, if it truly 
wishes to aid all women, including those who maintain a religious 
lifestyle.148 
A new approach is evident in the feminist movement as a re-
sult of this criticism.  Admittedly, coexistence between feminism and 
religion has been problematic in Islamic society.  Islamic principles 
are sometimes patriarchal or were interpreted as such in the past, as 
in the issues of polygamy or the laws of divorce.  Scholars like Okin, 
who held that feminist ideology should be dominant, wrote that the 
coexistence of a feminist outlook with the principles of Islam is very 
difficult.  She preferred a pragmatic approach.  She held that when-
ever possible, it is preferable that the change of rules and religious 
practices should come from the inside.  Women with a religious out-
look should try to initiate a new interpretation of the principles of 
their religious law in an attempt to enhance equality between the sex-
es.149 
However, Okin was not optimistic about this process.  She be-
lieved that often, religious law is rigid, and consequently the process 
of change is problematic.  She expressed her concern that the out-
come of this process will not always be the elevation of women’s sta-
tus in religious societies.150 
Interpretation of religious law could assist women in Israel in 
a specific context: conversion to Judaism.  Within Jewish law, im-
portant scholars in recent generations have adopted an approach that 
can assist those who wish to be accepted as converts, who are often 
women.  We should believe in the promise of interpretation of reli-
gious law.  In one sphere of Jewish law—conversion to Judaism—the 
rules in the modern period have often been interpreted in a manner 
 
148 Fiorenza, supra note 145, at 1084. 
149 Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 
117, at 117, 122–23. 
150 Although Okin thought that interpretation of religious law could produce effective re-
sults, she was not very optimistic about the outcome.  Okin argued that the problem facing 
women as a result of patriarchal principles in Islamic law should not be ignored.  In this 
sphere, there are not only difficulties concerning legal principles, but also practical difficul-
ties, with which those who wish to abolish patriarchal trends in existing Islamic law will 
have to cope.  See id. 
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that assisted females desiring to join the Jewish nation.  This proves 
that when interpreters of religious law wish to elevate the status of 
women, they can apply an effective method of interpretation bearing 
good results. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Israel was established in an attempt to create a shelter for 
Jews in the Diaspora.  In The Law of Return, Israel encourages the 
immigration of Jews and those related to Jews and married to them to 
the Jewish state.  A Jewish and democratic state could impose limits 
upon immigration to the state in an attempt to grant due weight to the 
right of self-determination of the Jewish majority.  The unique cir-
cumstances of Jewish history and survival justify this special policy 
of affirmative action.  The Jewish society in Israel has a right to pre-
serve the characteristics of its cultural-national Jewish identity in a 
unique Jewish state.  From a liberal point of view, the right to culture 
is important since it facilitates autonomy, which is possible only 
when the individual has many good options.  Furthermore, solidarity 
is important in all societies including the society of a Jewish and 
democratic state.  An essential foundation of a strong and stable soci-
ety is a strong mutual goal which is the foundation of the social con-
tract of its members. 
Many of the converts in Israel are immigrants and women.  Is-
rael should encourage, as much as possible, the implementation of a 
lenient conversion policy for these converts.  Sensitivity and empathy 
to the converts and immigrants to Israel, and an attempt to avoid the 
undesirable consequences of a strict religious approach in the sphere 
of conversion, are desirable.  An ancient Jewish text states that schol-
ars of Jewish law, including the Dayanim in Rabbinical courts, 
should enhance peace in the world.151  The path of peace is prefera-
ble.  This perspective of Jewish law and the perspective of enhancing 
autonomy, human liberty, and freedom coincide.  And these perspec-
tives lead to the same conclusion: the lenient approach is preferable 
in the sphere of conversion of members of weaker segments in Israeli 
society. 
Within Jewish law, important scholars in recent generations 
have adopted an approach that can assist those who wish to be ac-
 
151 See Bamidbar Rabbah 11:18. 
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cepted as converts, who are many times women.  When interpreters 
of religious law wish to elevate the status of women, they can apply 
an effective method of interpretation bearing good results. 
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